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1303 
Essay 
The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling 
Act, and the Politicization of the Federal 
Rules: Constitutional and Statutory 
Implications 
Martin H. Redish† and Uma M. Amuluru†† 
To a certain portion of the populace, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure probably represent little more than highly 
technical and esoteric directives for the day-to-day operation of 
the federal litigation process—if, indeed, they represent any-
thing at all. Even the average federal litigator may well think 
of the Rules primarily as either technical requirements that 
must be complied with or strategic devices employable to facili-
tate victory. In reality, however, many of the Federal Rules 
have a dramatic impact on fundamental socio-political and eco-
nomic concerns: the allocation of governmental resources, the 
redistribution of private wealth, the effectiveness of legisla-
tively imposed behavioral proscriptions, and concerns of fair-
ness and equality. This is probably not what either the Con-
gress that originally authorized them, the Advisory Committee 
that originally prepared them, or the Supreme Court Justices 
who originally promulgated them expected the Rules to do. 
Recognized at the time or not, however, the choices made by 
the drafters of the Rules have often had a significant impact on 
foundational moral, economic, and social choices made by soci-
ety as a whole. 
Over the last twenty-five years or so, the political stakes 
involved in shaping the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
gradually risen to the surface, and those interest groups most 
affected have responded accordingly. During that time, the 
process by which the Rules are revised has been made consid-
 
†  Louis & Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwest-
ern University School of Law. 
†† J.D. 2005, Northwestern University; A.B. 1999, Duke University. 
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erably more open, and affected organizations and entities have 
significantly increased their efforts to influence the direction 
those revisions take. 
It is all but inconceivable that it could have been any other 
way. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, at least, we can say 
with some assurance that it is impossible in most cases to com-
pletely separate the procedural from the substantive. Viewed 
from today’s perspective, the notion that by confining the Rules 
to matters of “procedure,” as the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 di-
rected,1 one could somehow prevent them from having impor-
tant and controversial socio-economic and political conse-
quences outside the courtroom is absurd. But formal 
recognition of the often-overlapping nature of the substantive-
procedural interaction on a political level did not come until the 
Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Electric Cooperative,2 a relatively late point in the development 
of the doctrine growing out of the Court’s momentous decision 
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.3 Even then, the recognition 
did not come in a case concerning the scope of the Federal 
Rules. Because Erie had not even been decided at the time of 
the Enabling Act’s passage in 1934, it is perhaps unreasonable 
anachronistically to superimpose on the congressional drafters 
a sophisticated understanding of how procedural choices may 
impact substantive policies. 
Be that as it may, the political realties of today are clear, 
and respected commentators have acknowledged the poten-
tially broad political impact of the Rules.4 What is so puzzling, 
however, is that despite widespread recognition of these reali-
ties, no scholar has provided a thoughtful analysis of what im-
plications, if any, this recognition should have on how we view 
the Rules Enabling Act’s constitutionality. 
Recognition of the inherently political nature of at least a 
portion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure raises funda-
 
 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) (“The Supreme Court shall have the 
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . .”). 
 2. See 356 U.S. 525, 549 (1958) (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The words ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ are mere concep-
tual labels and in no sense talismanic.”). 
 3. See 304 U.S. 64, 91–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (“The line be-
tween procedural and substantive law is hazy . . . .”). 
 4. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role 
of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1705 (2004); Paul D. Carrington, 
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 
290 (1989). 
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mental questions concerning the scope of our nation’s constitu-
tional democracy. The Supreme Court sits at the pinnacle of 
the one branch of the federal government formally insulated by 
the Constitution’s Framers from majoritarian pressures.5 While 
there were obvious and valid reasons for establishing such in-
sulation, there were also recognized risks to a democratic sys-
tem in doing so. To prevent the insulated judiciary from co-
opting the power of the representative and accountable 
branches, the Framers imposed significant restrictions on the 
scope of the judicial power. The Constitution grants to the judi-
ciary no purely legislative authority. To the extent the Supreme 
Court may promulgate subconstitutional federal law, it must do 
so as an incident to the performance of the inherently judicial 
function of case resolution.6 Yet the Rules Enabling Act invests 
in the Supreme Court lawmaking power untied to the judicial 
process. It was the statute’s express insulation of the authority 
to abridge or modify a “substantive right” that was generally 
assumed to preserve Congress’s legislative power.7 The reason-
ing appears to have been that where the Court merely promul-
gates rules of “procedure,” it is not overstepping its constitu-
tionally limited bounds because procedure is, by definition, 
internal to the operation of the judiciary; it has no impact out-
side the four walls of the courthouse. We now know—and 
probably should have known at the time of the Act’s passage—
that this is political nonsense. In numerous instances, proce-
dural choices inevitably—and often intentionally—impact the 
scope of substantive political choices. This recognition should 
logically raise a concern that the Act unconstitutionally vests in 
the Supreme Court power that is reserved, in a constitutional 
democracy, for those who are representative of and accountable 
to the electorate. 
We of course do not mean to suggest that the constitution-
ality of the Rules Enabling Act—at least as a practical mat-
ter—is today in serious doubt. The Supreme Court has confi-
dently asserted the Act’s constitutionality on more than one 
occasion,8 and there is absolutely no reason to imagine that this 
 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 6. Id. § 2, cl. 1 (granting federal judicial power to adjudication of cases 
and controversies). 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.”). 
 8. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989) (discussing 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), and various other cases); Sibbach 
REDISH_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:13:06 AM 
1306 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1303 
 
attitude will change in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, 
engaging in a constitutional inquiry at this point serves two 
important functions. First, purely as a matter of constitutional 
theory, there is legitimate intellectual interest in examining 
where the Court’s rulemaking power fits within the framework 
of the nation’s commitment to constitutional democracy. 
Second, and of more immediate pragmatic concern, recog-
nition of the serious constitutional difficulties to which the 
Rules Enabling Act inherently gives rise can and should have 
an important impact on construction of the Act’s directives. As 
already noted, by its express terms the Act insulates authority 
to abridge, enlarge, or modify a “substantive right” from the 
Court’s rulemaking power.9 Considerable judicial effort has 
gone into determination of the appropriate interpretation of 
this phrase, without anything approaching total satisfaction.10 
Nor have scholars come to consensus on the subject.11 
All concerned appear to have ignored that the Congress 
that drafted and passed the Act proceeded on a misguided as-
sumption about the completeness of the substance-procedure 
dichotomy when it imposed the “substantive right” restriction 
on the Court’s rulemaking power.12 Its obvious goal was to pre-
serve for the accountable and representative Congress funda-
mental normative choices of social policy, and Congress mis-
takenly believed it had achieved this goal by vesting in the 
Court solely the power to regulate “practice and procedure.”13 
The question now arises, how do we enforce the language the 
Act’s framers employed to restrict the Court’s policy-making 
 
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted power to 
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that 
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not 
inconsistent with the statutes or [C]onstitution of the United States . . . .”). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 10. See, e.g., Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 
U.S. 533, 552 (1991); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 391–93 
(1990); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987); Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9–10. 
 11. Compare Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1015, 1085–97 (1982) (advocating a historical approach to inter-
preting the Rules Enabling Act and requiring the allocation of power between 
the Supreme Court and Congress, not between the federal government and 
state government), with John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 693, 718–38 (1974) (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act subor-
dinates the Federal Rules to state rules based on substantive policy).  
 12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
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function (consistent with the Constitution’s democratic direc-
tives), when they proceeded on wholly fallacious practical and 
conceptual assumptions about the simplicity and totality of the 
substance-procedure dichotomy? The driving force behind rec-
ognition of this interpretive tension is the very democratic di-
rective that underlies the constitutional difficulty we have de-
scribed. In this sense, then, the issues of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation that surround the Rules Enabling Act 
are inextricably intertwined. This is so even if one begins 
analysis with the recognition that the constitutional issue is to-
day far more theoretical than real. 
We reach several conclusions on the basis of the serious 
democratic difficulty inherent in the Rules Enabling Act’s vest-
ing of rulemaking power in the Supreme Court’s hands. First, 
while the constitutionality of the Act, in whole or in part, is be-
yond question purely as a matter of controlling precedent, care-
ful examination of the Court’s decisions so holding reveals the 
complete absence of supporting logic or reasoning. Second, if 
one were to constitutionally analyze the Act’s insulation of im-
portant policy choices from any organ of government that is 
even remotely responsive to the electorate, at least in the first 
instance,14 it is highly likely that the Act would fail. Finally, 
even if one were to take the Act’s constitutionality as a doc-
trinal given, it is appropriate to employ parallel reasoning in 
construing the cryptic but nevertheless vital statutory insula-
tion of substantive rights from the scope of the Court’s rule-
making power. It is clear, after all, that the Act’s drafters were 
attempting, albeit crudely, to achieve the same result: the pres-
ervation of important policy choices for the elected representa-
tives of the people. 
As we begin our inquiry, two overarching points need to be 
kept in mind. First, to suggest that the rulemaking process has 
become “politicized” is by no means to suggest that the process 
has become corrupted. To the contrary, those interest groups 
who have sought to contribute to the rulemaking process ap-
pear to have done so in a thoughtful, persuasive, and wholly 
above-board manner. Nor is it to suggest that those involved in 
the rulemaking process—the Advisory Committee, the Stand-
ing Committee, or the Supreme Court—have in any way per-
formed their tasks improperly, unethically, or incompletely. In 
 
 14. Under the terms of the Enabling Act, Congress retains power, through 
legislative action, to reject Federal Rules submitted to it by the Supreme 
Court. See id. § 2074(b). 
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fact, the exact opposite appears to be true. The “corruption” of 
the system, if indeed that is the correct word, comes purely on 
the level of political process. In a democratic system, one does 
not judge political choices by the wisdom or good faith of the 
decision maker. Any individual or entity lacking the legitimacy 
of accountability and making subconstitutional policy choices 
is, at some level, inherently defective.15 
I.  THE RULES ENABLING ACT:  
STRUCTURE AND HISTORY 
A. THE ROLE OF THE SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY IN 
THE RULES ENABLING ACT 
The Rules Enabling Act arose out of a period of dissatisfac-
tion with an American civil procedure system that had become 
overly complicated and cumbersome. Reformers such as Roscoe 
Pound and Charles Clark believed that the judiciary needed to 
be more empowered and that judges should be afforded more 
discretion in shaping judicial procedure.16 The Act was finally 
passed during the New Deal era and embodied the anti-
formalistic, expertise-oriented spirit of the time.17 As such, it is 
unsurprising that neither Congress nor subsequent rulemakers 
clearly elucidated the limitations on the Supreme Court’s rule-
making power. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, lawyers had become 
increasingly frustrated with the common law pleading system. 
Because the technical pleading requirements attempted to re-
duce cases to a single issue, the “system became rigid and rare-
fied.”18 Parties often lost their suits on procedural grounds 
 
 15. Note that when the issue is the interpretation of the 
countermajoritarian Constitution, concern about the responsiveness of the de-
cision maker works in exactly the opposite manner. See MARTIN H. REDISH, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 75–85 (1991) (explaining the 
nature of the countermajoritarian principle and the role of the unaccountable 
Supreme Court in enforcing the Constitution). 
 16. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 944, 
947, 964 (1987). 
 17. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1706–08; see also Subrin, supra note 16, 
at 944, 946, 1000. 
 18. Subrin, supra note 16, at 917. 
Due to the countless pleading rules, a party could easily lose on tech-
nical grounds. Lawyers had to analogize to known writs and use “fic-
tions” because of the rigidity of some forms of action. Lawyers also 
found other ways around the common law rigidities, such as asserting 
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rather than on the merits of their claims.19 The reformers be-
hind the Rules Enabling Act identified this as the primary 
problem with the legal system.20 
It was within this legal climate at the dawn of the twenti-
eth century that legal reformers began to advocate dramatic 
change. They called for a uniform, simplified system and the 
merger of law and equity courts. Charles Clark bemoaned the 
complexity of common law procedure, famously writing, “proce-
dure should be the hand-maid and not the mistress of justice 
. . . [a]nd therefore rules of pleading or practice should at all 
times be but an aid to an end and not an end in themselves.”21 
Clark looked to the equity system for guidance, embracing its 
simplicity and flexibility.22 Thus began the twenty-five year 
battle to pass the Rules Enabling Act, legislation that would 
revolutionize federal procedure.23 
The key to the movement was the adoption of simple pro-
cedural rules that would enable litigants to reach the merits of 
their claims with relative ease. Pound sought to give judges the 
power to make their own procedural rules because the task 
called for the exercise of professional expertise.24 Flexible and 
uniform rules would provide judges with “discretion to overlook 
procedural mistakes and . . . a broader and more pliable litiga-
tion package.”25 The language of the Act, in relevant part, pro-
vided: 
The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to pre-
scribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States 
and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, 
writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil 
actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify 
the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six  
 
 
the common count and general denials, which made a mockery of the 
common law’s attempt to define, classify, and clarify. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 19. Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal 
Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 560 (1939). 
 20. See id. at 551–52. 
 21. Id. at 551. 
 22. See id. at 560–62; see also Subrin, supra note 16, at 962–63; cf. id. at 
922 (stating that the “underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embod-
ied in, the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] were almost universally drawn 
from equity rather than common law”). 
 23. For a more thorough description of the battle to enact the Rules Ena-
bling Act, see Burbank, supra note 11, at 1094–98. 
 24. Subrin, supra note 16, at 944–48. 
 25. Id. at 946. 
REDISH_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:13:06 AM 
1310 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1303 
 
months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict 
therewith shall be of no further force or effect.26 
The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for 
cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of 
civil action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That in such 
union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared 
by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to 
the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect until they 
shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the 
beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such 
session.27 
Pursuant to the Act, the Supreme Court appointed an Ad-
visory Committee, which was to draft the Rules and revise 
them as needed over time.28 After review by the Standing 
Committee of the Judicial Conference, the Rules were to be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court and then submitted by the Court 
to Congress for review. Unless rejected by congressional act 
prior to a specified date, the Rules were to go into effect.29 The 
first Advisory Committee was appointed and met shortly after 
the passage of the Act.30 Charles Clark served as reporter and 
drafted the bulk of what were to become the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.31 
B. REACTIONS TO JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: THE EARLY 
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE 
DICHOTOMY 
Given the breathtaking scope of power that the Rules Ena-
bling Act allocated to the Supreme Court, it is surprising how 
few questions were raised as to its constitutionality at the time 
of its passage. Despite the presence of a few staunch resisters, 
neither the early reformers nor the first Advisory Committee  
 
 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 723(b) (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) 
(2000)). 
 27. Id. § 723(c) (emphasis omitted). 
 28. See Clark, supra note 19, at 555–56. 
 29. See id. at 557. The current version provides: “(a) The Supreme Court 
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and 
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including pro-
ceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals. (b) Such 
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(a)–(b) (2000). 
 30. See Clark, supra note 19, at 555–56. 
 31. See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1975) (providing a description 
of Clark’s involvement in crafting the Federal Rules). 
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ever articulated a detailed defense of the Act’s constitutional-
ity.32 This was probably due to the widespread, albeit falla-
cious, assumption about the mutual exclusivity between mat-
ters of procedure and matters of substance. History clearly 
shows that the drafters of the Act and the early Supreme Court 
opinions interpreting the Act operated under an unduly sim-
plistic understanding of the substantive implications of proce-
dure.33 They seemed to have proceeded on the assumption that 
procedure and substantive law were mutually exclusive—a no-
tion now universally recognized to be woefully unrealistic. The 
drafters did seem to intuit some of the potential problems of 
democratic theory to which the Act gave rise, though perhaps 
more as a strategic protection of congressional domain. Their 
problem, however, was their failure to recognize how the rule-
making authority affected matters of social policy. 
The idea for a uniform federal procedure bill was not well 
received by everyone. Senator Walsh of Montana, for example, 
stood fast as an opponent of the bill for over fifteen years.34 
Drawing on Walsh’s objections to the reform movement,35 in 
1917 a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed a 
report entitled “Views of the Minority” suggesting that Con-
gress may not have constitutional authority to delegate the 
power to make supervisory rules of procedure.36 However, due 
to the “long history of Congress’s acquiescence in the Supreme 
Court’s promulgation of Equity Rules,”37 Walsh did not yet em-
brace the delegation controversy, but instead focused on the 
pragmatic interpretive problems and inconveniences the new 
system would create.38 By 1926, Walsh expanded his criticisms  
 
 
 32. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1114. Professor Burbank notes that 
the “individuals concerned about allocation standards were not primarily ani-
mated by constitutional considerations . . . . To the extent [they] referred to 
constitutional limitations, it was to fortify support for statutory limitations 
independently deemed appropriate, which Congress had the power to impose 
in the Act.” Id. at 1114–15. 
 33. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 6–16 (1941). 
 34. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1063–95. Senator Walsh’s opposition 
ended with his death in 1933, finally allowing the long-awaited passage of the 
bill in 1934. Id. at 1095. 
 35. See id. at 1064. 
 36. See S. REP. NO. 64-892, pt. 2, at 6–9 (1917); see also Burbank, supra 
note 11, at 1064 (observing that a majority of the committee signed the “Views 
of the Minority” section of the senate report). 
 37. Burbank, supra note 11, at 1064. 
 38. See id. at 1063–65. 
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and openly protested that the judiciary’s rulemaking authority 
would usurp legislative power.39 
In response to these protests, Senator Cummins redrafted 
the bill to add the somewhat cryptic sentence, “Said rules shall 
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of 
any litigant.”40 Professor Burbank’s historical research sug-
gests that Cummins intended to quell the delegation objections 
with this addition.41 In a letter to Chief Justice Taft regarding 
the addition, Cummins wrote, “Congress could not if it wanted 
to, confer upon the Supreme Court, legislative power,” and 
therefore the additional sentence should “quiet the apprehen-
sions of those who may be opposed to any measure of this 
sort.”42 Thus the language of the Rules Enabling Act codified 
the reformers’ belief that as long as the judiciary limited its 
scope to “procedural” matters and not “substantive” ones, it 
would not encroach on legislative functions. 
The substance-procedure dichotomy soon became the ac-
cepted response to separation of powers arguments asserted 
against the uniform procedure bill. Professor Burbank docu-
ments that in the face of numerous criticisms alleging that the 
bill was a judicial usurpation, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
simply reiterated that the judiciary would not have the power 
to affect substantive rights.43 Puzzlingly, the committee also 
drew on the history of judicial rulemaking in England and the 
several states,44 despite the quite obvious fact that 
constitutional restrictions do not bind those entities to the 
same extent that they restrain the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Thus, the drafters of the Rules Enabling Act believed that 
historical practice and the enigmatic substance-procedure di-
chotomy immunized the Act from constitutional scrutiny as an 
 
 39. Senator Thomas J. Walsh, Reform of Federal Procedure, Address at a 
meeting of the Tri-State Bar Association (Apr. 23, 1926), in S. REP. NO. 69-
1174, at 20, 33 (1926). 
 40. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1072–73. 
 41. See id. at 1073. 
 42. See id. at 1073 n.260 (quoting the full text of the letter). 
 43. See id. at 1085–89. “The Senate Committee deemed the suggestion 
that the bill involved an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the 
Supreme Court one that could ‘hardly be urged seriously’ in light of the history 
of such delegations and the opinions of the Supreme Court discussing them.” 
Id. at 1085 (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 8 (report submitted by Mr. Cum-
mins, member of Committee on the Judiciary)). 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 9–10.  
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improper delegation of congressional legislative power. How-
ever, it soon became clear that neither the drafters nor the first 
Advisory Committee had much sense of what the terms “sub-
stance” and “procedure” meant in the context of the Rules Ena-
bling Act. The Senate Committee, for its part, trusted the Su-
preme Court to check itself.45 After the passage of the Rules 
Enabling Act, the Advisory Committee commissioned to draft 
the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1935 did not articulate any clear 
standard for differentiating between substance and proce-
dure.46 In fact, Professor Burbank’s extensive historical re-
search reveals that the Advisory Committee “had no coherent 
or consistent view of the limitations imposed by the Act’s pro-
 
 45. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1137. In its report, the Senate Com-
mittee wrote:  
  Any power in the Supreme Court to deal with such matters as 
those referred to must be rested solely upon the provision authorizing 
it to make rules relating to “practice and procedure in actions at law.” 
In view of the express provision inhibiting the court from affecting 
“the substantive rights of any litigant,” any court would be astute to 
avoid an interpretation which would attribute to the words “practice 
and procedure” an intention on the part of Congress to delegate a 
power to deal with such substantive rights or remedies. It would 
rather conclude that in using the words “practice and procedure” 
Congress only intended to confer the power to make such rules of 
practice and procedure as the court itself could make without ena-
bling legislation, and they would not include matters of the kind re-
ferred to. 
  . . . . 
  Where a doubt exists as to the power of a court to make a rule, the 
doubt will surely be resolved by construing a statutory provision in 
such a way that it will not have the effect of an attempt to delegate to 
the courts what is in reality a legislative function. And it is inconceiv-
able that any court will hold that rules which deprive a man of his 
liberty, as in the case of an order of arrest, or put an end to a good 
cause of action, as in the case of a limitation or abatement of an ac-
tion, or determine what jurors shall try a case and how they shall be 
selected, are merely filling “up the details,” even though they relate to 
remedial rights. 
S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 11. 
 46. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1133 n.530. Clark himself articulated 
this uncertainty in a letter to Professor Carl Wheaton in 1935, stating: 
I cannot avoid the feeling that much of our procedural discussion gets 
really quite barren, that it is in effect word play, where we make 
words mean the definite things which they mean to us but which they 
have never meant to the code makers; and then, having gotten our-
selves all tied up in words and achieved unlovely results, the only way 
out we can suggest is by remaking the code, a result utterly unrealis-
tic and practically never to be expected. 
Letter from Charles E. Clark to Professor Carl Wheaton (Feb. 16, 1935), in 
JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 139, 139 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991). 
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cedure/substance dichotomy.”47 He further notes that although 
members of the committee occasionally referred to the history 
of the passage of the Rules Enabling Act, “one leaves the pub-
lished and unpublished sources with the impression that, al-
though the committee may have recognized the basic purpose of 
the procedure/substance dichotomy, in formulating and apply-
ing the Act’s limitations normative considerations took a back 
seat to practical possibilities.”48 Burbank’s sources also reveal 
that the committee was satisfied “to rely largely on judgments 
informed by a sense of the professional and political climate 
and by the hope that the Supreme Court would preserve it from 
error.”49 
II.  THE CONFLATION OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE: 
THE POLITICIZATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES 
It is beyond controversy today that many Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure implicate substantial policy issues, often going 
to the core of modern political and ideological debates. Indeed, 
the Court itself has noted that “rulemaking under the enabling 
Acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the 
rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive 
rights of litigants.”50 This fact is not earthshaking. Rules 11 
(dealing with sanctions),51 23 (providing for class actions),52 and 
26 (concerning discovery)53 are just a few of the Rules that di-
rectly implicate tort-reform issues and have therefore become 
the subject of debate and the object of lobbying efforts by inter-
est groups such as consumer-advocacy organizations, large cor-
porations, and trial lawyers associations.54 Growing out of the 
 
 47. Burbank, supra note 11, at 1132. 
 48. See id. at 1133–35. 
 49. Id. at 1137. 
 50. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989). “Rule 23 . . . has 
inspired a controversy over the philosophical, social, and economic merits and 
demerits of class actions.” Id. at 392 n.19. 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 54. See, e.g., Transcript of Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www 
.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/DallasHearing12805.pdf [hereinafter Dallas 
Hearing Transcript]. Among the various groups testifying at the Dallas hear-
ing were the Texas Trial Lawyers Association, corporate counsel from Exxon 
Mobil Corporation, and consumer advocate groups. See id. at 3–19, 35–51, 68–
101. Similarly, representatives from organizations such as the American In-
surance Association, Defense Research Institute, National Association of Con-
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heavily disputed belief that the U.S. court system is overbur-
dened with frivolous civil lawsuits that harass corporate defen-
dants and lead inexorably to higher prices for goods and ser-
vices, the modern tort-reform movement includes proposals to 
impose damage caps, rewrite contributory negligence laws, and 
impose heavier sanctions on people bringing frivolous suits.55 
Underlying the tort-reform debate are more foundational dis-
putes over ideology and normative political theory.56 These is-
sues implicate the value placed on such substantive policy con-
cerns as civil rights and consumer protection, as well as 
fundamental questions about societal resource allocation, 
wealth transfer, and economic efficiency.57 The inescapable im-
plication is that how society structures its system of adjudica-
tion inevitably has a substantial impact on the protection of 
substantive rights and the foundations of substantive social 
policy. 
The recent political focus on issues of tort reform has un-
derscored the politicization of many of the Federal Rules.58 The 
political nature of the Rules, however, is by no means a recent 
development, despite the failure of both the Enabling Act’s 
drafters and the postenactment Supreme Court either to recog-
nize or acknowledge this fact. To the contrary, from the outset 
many of the Rules possessed a distinctly political nature be-
cause the manner in which they are shaped inherently impacts 
the enforcement of society’s substantive policy choices. 
One of the most visible illustrations of this phenomenon is 
Rule 11, which enables judges to sanction lawyers for filing 
 
sumer Advocates, American Trial Lawyers Association, Lawyers for Civil Jus-
tice, and Alliance of American Insurers attended the class action amendment 
hearings. Other rules scrutinized in the context of tort reform are the notice 
pleading rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 8, and the summary judgment rule, FED. R. CIV. 
P. 56. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Liti-
gation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day 
in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1009–10, 
1074–77 (2003). 
 55. See Miller, supra note 54 (discussing these contentions and concluding 
that the drive toward efficiency threatens to undermine the right to a trial by 
jury); see also Carl Hulse, Bill To Require Sanctions on Lawyers Passes House, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at A20 (describing legislation to amend the current 
version of Rule 11 to mandate sanctions for filing baseless lawsuits). 
 56. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Ten-
sions in Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 363–68 (2003/2004). 
 57. See id. at 340. 
 58. See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 55 (describing the political debate over 
Rule 11 in the context of tort reform). 
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pleadings or motions for dilatory or other improper purposes.59 
As revised in 1983, Rule 11 required certification that, among 
other things, the pleading or motion was “well grounded in 
fact.”60 This alteration was quite obviously (albeit indirectly) 
intended to constrain the sweeping scope of Rule 8(a),61 which 
established the so-called “notice pleading” system. Under the 
framework of the system created by Judge Clark and the origi-
nal Advisory Committee, all a litigant need do in a pleading is 
provide “a short and plain statement” of the claim62—an inten-
tionally low burden.63 The underlying goal of the system was to 
enable litigants to initiate use of the Rules’ elaborate discovery 
process to facilitate the enforcement of substantive claims.64 By 
effectively expanding the scope of the parties’ burdens at the 
pleading stage, the 1983 version of Rule 11 dramatically im-
pacted the ability of plaintiffs to enforce their substantive 
rights65 and, not surprisingly, gave rise to significant political 
debate. 
In contrast, the next revision of Rule 11 ten years later fa-
cilitated plaintiffs’ enforcement of substantive claims by remov-
ing the requirement that the litigant certify that the assertions 
 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c). 
 60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1987, 1993). 
 61. See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It 
Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1164 (1993) (observing that the two 
rules are “almost self-contradictory”). 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (1938) (amended 1966, 1987); see also FED. R. CIV. 
P. Form 9 (1938) (amended 1963) (providing a legally sufficient sample plead-
ing). 
 63. See Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain 
Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains 
Prophetically Correct About Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 
971, 1007 (2005) (quoting Judge Charles Clark). 
 64. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (rejecting 
heightened pleading requirements for employment discrimination claims); 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading requirements for 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) 
(“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in 
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules 
require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Christopher M. Fairman, 
Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 556–57 (2002). See generally FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8(a) (2000) (describing claims for relief). 
 65. Note that Rule 11’s expansion came indirectly, since the revisers in 
1983 purported to leave the Rule 11 burden unchanged. 
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contained in her pleading are “well grounded in fact.”66 A cen-
tral element of the tort-reform movement has therefore been an 
attempt to strengthen Rule 11 through congressional enact-
ment.67 In September 2004, the House of Representatives ap-
proved a measure amending the current (1993) version of Rule 
11 to require sanctions on lawyers who file “frivolous” law-
suits.68 Not surprisingly, the bill was politically polarizing; Re-
publicans touted it as necessary “to end nuisance lawsuits that 
. . . were driving companies out of business and costing con-
sumers,” while Democrats said it “could make it harder for less-
affluent Americans to retain legal counsel if lawyers were nerv-
ous about facing sanctions.”69 
Also illustrative of the extent to which the Rules may be-
come intertwined with matters of important social policy is the 
recent amendment concerning electronic discovery.70 The Advi-
sory Committee hearings on the issue are replete with testi-
 
 66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Professor Miller wrote that the “strengthening 
of Rule 11 [in 1983] created a theoretically significant barrier to entering the 
judicial system. . . . [T]he 1983 Rule was criticized for having a disproportion-
ate impact, particularly in areas of the law considered ‘disfavored’ by some 
. . . .” Miller, supra note 54, at 1007–08. Because of the Rule’s sanctioning 
measure, it could “be used against a party who brings a frivolous pretrial dis-
position motion, and may serve to deter them.” Id. at 1009. Professor Miller 
further noted that “[a]fter several years of extraordinary activity under the 
[1983] Rule, a comprehensive study by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) re-
vealed that Rule 11 motions were filed much more frequently by defendants, 
that defendants’ motions were granted with greater frequency, and that Rule 
11 motions were filed disproportionately more often in civil rights cases, al-
though the grant rate was not necessarily higher.” Id. See also Carl Tobias, 
The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 176–78 (1994), for a 
description of the process of revising the 1983 version of Rule 11. 
 67. See H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 68. Hulse, supra note 55. 
 69. Id. Democrats also commented that Republicans were “wasting time 
with frivolous legislation,” and said the measure “represented a needless Con-
gressional intrusion into local court matters.” Id. Representative Sheila Jack-
son Lee stated that the House should “[g]ive the decision back to the court-
house, and let’s have a fair judicial system for all.” Id. 
 70. Rules 26 and 34, which regulate the production of evidence in litiga-
tion, are the critical rules governing the discovery of electronic information. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 34. On May 17, 2004, the Civil Rules Advisory Commit-
tee submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure a 
comprehensive package of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure addressing discovery of electronically stored information, including 
revisions of Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45. See CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., 
REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (2004), http://www.uscourts 
.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Report]. 
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mony by trial lawyers associations, representatives of large 
global companies, and spokespersons for consumer groups.71 
Naturally, regulations of electronic discovery will have impor-
tant and inescapable implications both for litigants’ ability to 
enforce existing substantive law and for businesses of all sizes 
seeking to operate in an economically efficient manner.72 Plain-
tiffs’ lawyers and consumer advocacy groups favored rules that 
require litigants to preserve as much material as possible for as 
long as possible.73 Large corporations and the defense bar, on 
the other hand, stressed the great expense of electronic-
document storage, and favored more lenient provisions on 
mandatory disclosure and record preservation.74 Such propos-
als could readily implicate fundamental policy debates. Plain-
tiffs often depend on electronic discovery to support their ef-
forts to compel wealth transfer and enforce substantive 
restrictions on corporate behavior,75 while the Rules’ dictates 
may force corporate defendants to incur enormous expense in 
altering their record-keeping systems. The impact of electronic 
discovery on social and economic policy is thus significant. 
Perhaps the rule that has generated the most intense po-
litical controversy in recent years is Rule 23, governing the pro-
cedures for class action suits. Although Rule 23 was part of the 
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was not until 1966 
that sweeping revisions transformed class actions into a power-
 
 71. See, e.g., Dallas Hearing Transcript, supra note 54, at 3–19, 35–51, 
68–101, 136–53. Similarly, the class action amendment hearings were at-
tended by representatives from organizations such as the American Insurance 
Association, Defense Research Institute, National Association of Consumer 
Advocates, American Trial Lawyers Association, Lawyers for Civil Justice, and 
Alliance of American Insurers. 
 72. See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 70, at 20. 
 73. See Dallas Hearing Transcript, supra note 54, at 17–19 (statement of 
Jim Wren, Counsel, Texas Trial Lawyer’s Association); id. at 80–81 (statement 
of Paul Bland, Counsel, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice); id. at 146–49 
(statement of Steve Morrison, Past President, Lawyers for Civil Justice). 
 74. See id. at 47 (statement of Charles Beach, Coordinator of Corporate 
Litigation, Exxon Mobil Corporation); id. at 58–61 (statement of Ann Ker-
shaw, Founder of A. Kershaw, PC, Attorneys and Consultants, a litigation 
management firm that surveyed large companies and compiled findings on the 
burdens of electronic discovery). 
 75. See id. at 71 (“In the consumer class action world a great deal of litiga-
tion can only be proven with respect to financial services companies, HMOs or 
whatnot, with databases, with documents that are never, ever put onto paper. 
The documents simply don’t exist on paper.”) (statement of Paul Bland, Coun-
sel, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice). 
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ful tool for implementing socio-political change.76 The modern 
class action arose out of a period of social and political revolu-
tion; in the wake of the civil rights movement and the social 
revolution of President Johnson’s “Great Society” programs, the 
rulemakers saw a need for procedural devices that would le-
gally empower otherwise unempowered groups.77 Thus, in 
1966, they transformed Rule 23,78 and it has since become an 
important instrument for enforcement of legislative and com-
mon law proscriptions of business behavior.79 On the other 
hand, because class actions may well threaten a company’s very 
existence, class action suits may coerce corporate defendants 
into settling even nonmeritorious claims. Because the costs of 
these settlements will be passed on to consumers, unduly lax 
class-certification standards will inevitably lead to undue infla-
tion and economic inefficiency. Regardless of their substantive 
views, both sides of the class action debate can agree that class 
action procedure lies at the core of fundamental political and 
ideological choices. 
III.  RECONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY  
OF THE RULES ENABLING ACT 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT 
It should by now be clear that the assumption of proce-
dural-substantive mutual exclusivity that apparently underlay 
the thinking of both Congress and the Court in the early years 
is totally misguided. No one today could seriously doubt that 
procedural rulemaking involves the weighing of substantial 
policy interests and dynamically alters the development of the 
substantive law. Surely it is just such policy choices that our 
system of constitutional democracy contemplates will be made 
by those who are at some level responsive to the electorate, at  
 
 
 76. The original rule was complex and confusing and therefore underuti-
lized. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) (amended 1966, 1987, 1998, 2003); Benja-
min Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 380–86 (1967). Kap-
lan rewrote the rule to make it more coherent and easier to use. See id. at 
386–94. 
 77. See Kaplan, supra note 76, at 380–86, 397–98. 
 78. See id. at 386–94. 
 79. See, e.g., Al Meyerhoff, Op-Ed., Legal Reform It’s Not, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
31, 2005, at B9. 
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least when those choices are made apart from the adjudication 
of cases or controversies. 
What appears to remain unrecognized by anyone are the 
logical implications of this insight for the widespread assump-
tion of the Rules Enabling Act’s constitutionality. The founda-
tional political and ideological debates that are often triggered 
by the framing of the Federal Rules are not resolved by any in-
dividual or entity even indirectly responsive to the public will. 
To the contrary, final choices are made by the one organ of the 
federal government that is constitutionally insulated from elec-
toral pressures.80 Intuitively, at least, this segregation of key 
political choices from responsive governmental organs appears 
highly problematic. 
When one attempts to translate this intuitive uneasiness 
into hard constitutional law, one is naturally drawn to the 
nondelegation doctrine81 and to the case-or-controversy re-
quirement of Article III.82 In relying on the nondelegation doc-
trine and the case-or-controversy requirement, we readily ac-
knowledge that the instinctive reaction of most constitutional 
observers will be either a collective yawn or a feeling of consti-
tutional déjà vu. It is true, after all, that the last time the 
nondelegation doctrine played an important role in constitu-
tional law, Franklin Roosevelt was president.83 Though the 
case-or-controversy requirement has continued to play a sig-
nificant role in the shaping of modern justiciability doctrine,84 
the Court has been something less than rigid in enforcing its  
 
 
 
 80. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing members of the federal judici-
ary with protections of salary and tenure). 
 81. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
529–30 (1935) (“Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others 
the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”). 
 82. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 83. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 529–30; Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935). 
 84. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (“The constitutional power of federal 
courts cannot be defined, and indeed has no substance, without reference to 
the necessity ‘to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’” 
(quoting Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). 
The case-or-controversy requirement is the textual foundation for all of the 
prudential justiciability doctrines that forbid federal courts from adjudicating 
purely political questions, issuing advisory opinions, hearing moot issues, or 
hearing a case when a litigant lacks standing to maintain an action. 
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dictates where Congress has made clear that it wishes federal 
judges to perform nonadjudicatory tasks.85 
Yet one may reasonably begin the constitutional analysis 
by reference to the following assumption: were Congress, hypo-
thetically, to enact a law delegating to the Article III judiciary 
the authority to promulgate prospectively controlling “rules” of 
federal products liability or consumer protection law, the legis-
lation would be held unconstitutional. No matter how much 
modern constitutional scholars mock structural doctrines of 
separation of powers, there is some point at which the Consti-
tution would be found to prohibit the delegation of purely legis-
lative authority to the Supreme Court. The inquiry, then, 
should concern where that constitutional line should be drawn, 
and on which side of that line the Rules Enabling Act falls. 
The best way to assess the constitutionality of the Rules 
Enabling Act is to inquire exactly what it is about the hypo-
thetical delegation statute that renders it so unambiguously 
unconstitutional; why is it that Congress may not constitution-
ally delegate to the Supreme Court the authority, independent 
of the adjudicatory function, to promulgate rules of federal con-
sumer protection or products liability law? Textually, there is 
little doubt that if the Supreme Court could exercise such 
power, Article III’s case-or-controversy limitation would be 
meaningless; the Court would be doing far more than adjudi-
cating cases or controversies. Moreover, the Court would be ex-
ercising purely legislative authority, vested solely in Congress 
by Article I.86 
It is important to note that this hypothetical statute would 
be unconstitutional, despite the fact that the Court has vali-
dated sweeping delegations of legislative authority to executive 
agencies.87 The differences are twofold, and both derive ulti-
mately from the Court’s unique status in the American political 
system. Unlike any member of Congress or the President, Jus- 
 
 
 85. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (holding that 
“Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently 
specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements”); see also Morrison 
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988). 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
 87. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 
(1943) (upholding largely standardless delegation of authority to the Federal 
Communications Commission pursuant to the Federal Communications Act of 
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 305 (2000)). 
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tices are not elected.88 Unlike any administrator, they sit for 
life and have special protection of their independence.89 Profes-
sor Mashaw has argued that delegations of legislative authority 
to executive agencies are constitutional, because members of 
those agencies are accountable to the President, who is himself 
representative of and accountable to the electorate.90 The same 
cannot be said of Supreme Court Justices. Thus, to the extent 
one key concern about congressional delegations of legislative 
authority is a dilution of decision-making accountability that is 
the sine qua non of a democratic system, the constitutional dif-
ficulty is significantly exacerbated by delegations to an unrep-
resentative and unaccountable Court. 
One might respond that congressional delegation of law-
making authority to the federal judiciary is a well-accepted 
practice. For example, Congress vested in the courts the power 
to fashion the law of restraint of trade,91 or shape the federal 
law of labor contracts.92 But the obvious difference is that the 
federal courts are vested with the power to do so only through 
performance of the adjudicatory function.93 Courts must pos-
sess authority to fill gaps in controlling substantive law in this 
manner, if only as a means of facilitating the resolution of live 
disputes.94 This is far different from the rulemaking of admin-
istrative agencies, which is untied to such dispute resolution.95 
It is performance of the adjudicatory function that leads to 
the second constitutional problem with the hypothetical statu-
 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President shall have 
the power to nominate Supreme Court Justices). 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (guaranteeing salary and tenure). 
 90. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985). So-called “independent” 
agencies are somewhat more problematic, because their members are not sub-
ject to total executive control. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602, 625 (1935). At the very least, however, members of such agencies do not 
sit for life, nor do they have constitutionally imposed protections of their sala-
ries. Thus, they are far more responsive than are members of the federal judi-
ciary, who are protected by Article III. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing 
that a judge’s compensation may not decrease during his or her tenure). 
 91. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 92. See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union of Am., 353 U.S. 448, 448 
(1957). 
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 94. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170–72 (1803) (justifying judicial 
review as a necessary element of the resolution of live disputes). 
 95. For an argument seeking to distinguish administrative and adjudica-
tory delegations, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE 140–41 (1995). 
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tory delegation of lawmaking authority to the Supreme Court: 
the absence of any limitation of the judicial function to the reso-
lution of live disputes. Once again, the concern finds its origins 
in the nation’s foundational democratic commitment to law-
making by representative and accountable decision makers. 
The case-or-controversy limitation clearly has the effect of re-
straining the one branch of government constitutionally insu-
lated from political pressure. There are, of course, many valid 
reasons for the Framers’ decision to include such insulation.96 
But in a nation whose founders fought to end taxation without 
representation, the establishment of a coordinate branch of 
government that is representative of, and accountable to, no 
one naturally gave rise to the concern that said branch might 
usurp the lawmaking authority vested in the more representa-
tive branches. The means for preventing this development, 
then, was the simultaneous restriction of the judiciary’s power 
to the performance of its traditional function of dispute resolu-
tion. If the courts were to make law, it would have to be as an 
incident to the performance of this function. 
The hypothetical authorization of freestanding judicial 
lawmaking quite clearly undermines this fundamental element 
of American political theory. The constitutional difficulty, then, 
goes far deeper than merely some formalist, textual focus on 
the words, “case” or “controversy,” appearing in Article III.97 
Here, abandonment of the Constitution’s case-or-controversy 
limitation would lead to the very result that the Framers were 
presumably seeking to avoid by imposing the limitation in the 
first place. 
Before one can apply this constitutional analysis of the hy-
pothetical legislative delegation of consumer protection or 
products liability lawmaking power to the Supreme Court in 
the Rules Enabling Act context, one must consider the opposite 
end of the constitutional spectrum. While Article III confines 
the judicial power to the adjudication of cases and controver-
sies, there must be certain common sense qualifications on such 
a restriction. For example, the federal judiciary may hire law 
clerks and secretaries, even though neither activity, in and of 
 
 96. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining the need for an independent judiciary); see also 
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and 
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (exploring vari-
ous rationales for judicial independence). 
 97. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
REDISH_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:13:06 AM 
1324 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1303 
 
itself, constitutes adjudication of a case or controversy. Pre-
sumably, the federal judiciary could also hold conferences or 
plan an annual holiday party, despite the total absence of any 
adjudicatory element. The questions to ask are: (1) how, for 
constitutional purposes, do these situations differ from the hy-
pothetical delegation of consumer protection lawmaking 
power?; and (2) to which of the two paradigms is the Rules 
Enabling Act closer? 
The constitutional difference between the two extremes 
should not be difficult to discern. On the one hand, statutorily 
authorized lawmaking (what can be called “paradigm one”) is 
simply a blatant circumvention of the case-or-controversy re-
quirement and of the democratic purposes that requirement is 
designed to serve. The hiring, conferences, and party-planning 
hypotheticals (“paradigm two”), on the other hand, have no 
readily discernable impact on the lives of citizens beyond the 
four walls of the courthouse. 
The drafters of the Rules Enabling Act erred in assuming 
that, by confining the Court’s rulemaking authority to matters 
of “procedure,” they were creating a “paradigm two” judicial 
power when, in reality, they were creating what, in all too 
many instances, is a “paradigm one” power. The assumption—
absurdly simplistic when viewed from today’s intellectual and 
pragmatic perspectives—appears to have been that matters of 
“procedure” necessarily have no impact on substantive rights. 
Thus, by only issuing rules of procedure, the Court would be do-
ing nothing more than regulating matters whose impact would 
largely be confined within the courthouse’s four walls.98 How-
ever, many of the Rules either (a) give rise to significant politi-
cal or ideological controversy; (b) have a significant impact on 
the enforcement of substantive rights;99 (c) are intended to af-
fect the substantive reallocation of private societal resources;100 
(d) have a significant impact on private prelitigation behav-
ior;101 (e) directly impact, if not control, subsequent litigation in 
 
 98. This also appears to have been the early Supreme Court’s view. See 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941). 
 99. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 11 (addressing the level of detail 
expected from a party in the pleading filed at the outset of the suit); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56 (concerning summary judgment). 
 100. See Kaplan, supra note 76, at 398 (explaining how the 1966 revision of 
Rule 23, expanding class action availability, was designed in part to facilitate 
enforcement of “Great Society” social measures of the 1960s). 
 101. An illustration is the new amendment concerning electronic discovery. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)–(d). 
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other forums;102 or (f) affect the burdens on, expense of, or de-
lays in the federal courts, thereby impacting citizens well be-
yond the scope of the individual case.103 Yet all of these rules 
are, in some reasonable sense, also capable of being classified 
as “procedural.” 
It is certainly true that not all of the Federal Rules will 
have such an impact. A number of them are readily classified 
among the “housekeeping” variety, at most affecting any inter-
est beyond the confines of the instant case only remotely.104 
Thus, it is conceivable that some number of the Rules could 
properly be deemed closer to paradigm two than to paradigm 
one for purposes of constitutional analysis. But the nondelega-
tion and case-or-controversy limits are normatively driven by 
the fundamental goal of preserving basic policy making for 
those who are in some sense representative of, and accountable 
to, the populace.105 Acknowledgement of this fundamental pre-
cept of American political and constitutional theory renders the 
Rules Enabling Act, as implemented by the Advisory Commit-
tee and the Court, constitutionally suspect. 
One might respond that Congress always possesses the 
power to trump the rules the Court promulgates pursuant to 
the Act, simply by enacting a statute doing so. Therefore the 
accountability value is still satisfied. While in a certain sense 
this is true, it would be just as true of the Court’s authority to 
promulgate freestanding rules of federal consumer protection 
law (paradigm one): Congress could always enact legislation 
voiding a particular rule, just as it can for the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Yet, presumably, recognition of this legislative 
safety valve would not save the constitutionality of such legis-
lative delegation to the Court.106 This is because, by impacting 
 
 102. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (establishing a compulsory counterclaim 
rule having a preclusive effect on subsequent litigation). 
 103. For example, the level of detail demanded in pleading will inevitably 
impact the scope of postpleading discovery. 
 104. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 10 (concerning captioning). 
 105. We should emphasize, once again, that we do not intend to refer to 
constitutional questions, though of course the case-or-controversy requirement 
should logically apply to the judicial resolution of those issues as well. Our 
point here, however, is merely that for policy choices not even arguably impli-
cating the scope of a constitutional provision, the nation’s commitment to 
foundational normative precepts of democratic theory, embodied in the Consti-
tution, prohibits the unrepresentative judiciary from making them apart from 
as an incident to the resolution of live disputes. 
 106. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
529–30 (1935). 
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the daily lives of citizens and stimulating political controversy, 
the judicially promulgated Rules alter the legal and behavioral 
status quo.107 When Rules have issued, the inertia of the legal 
and political systems has been placed squarely in favor of the 
standards adopted in those Rules. Congress must overcome the 
serious (and intended) inertia against legislative action to alter 
or supplant the Rules’ dictates.108 Absent the Rules, in contrast, 
there would be no political inertia in favor of any alternative. 
With the Rules in place, congressional inaction effectively 
amounts to action; with no Rules promulgated, congressional 
inaction is just that. 
To suggest that it might be unconstitutional for Congress 
to vest procedural rulemaking power in the Supreme Court is 
most certainly not to suggest that there could be no Federal 
Rules, or even that there could be no Advisory Committee. It 
would mean, simply, that the Rules (at least those not of the 
housekeeping variety) would ultimately have to come from 
Congress and be signed by the President. Presumably, the Ad-
visory Committee could still make recommendations, but to 
Congress, rather than to the Court. Alternatively, our account-
ability critique could be applied in a more limited fashion, 
holding unconstitutional only those Rules that are found to im-
plicate significant economic, social, or political dispute. Such an 
approach would leave a somewhat wider constitutional range of 
Supreme Court rulemaking authority. 
The concern of many, no doubt, would be that if the ulti-
mate power and obligation to promulgate the Rules of Proce-
dure lay in Congress’s hands, interest groups of all shapes and 
sizes would likely consume the legislative process. The concern 
is that having Congress make the decisions would be too “po-
litical.” But the point is that many of these rules will be “politi-
cal,” whoever gets to shape them, because they may substan-
tially affect the lives of the citizenry and implicate fundamental 
ideological choices about loss allocation and resource redistri- 
 
 
 107. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–59 (1983) (characterizing a one-
house veto as lawmaking). 
 108. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 
592–93 (“The congressional legislative process is an arduous one that may en-
tail a series of compromises from the time the bill is introduced until it is fi-
nally voted upon by the members of each house. Further, the process is 
lengthy, time-consuming, and replete with opportunities for delaying or killing 
a bill.”); see also id. (citing sources). 
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bution. Taking the decision out of the hands of those who are 
representative of, and accountable to, the populace will mean, 
simply, that the one branch of government insulated from the 
populace will be making important political decisions in a 
manner never contemplated by the text, structure, or history of 
the Constitution. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RULES ENABLING ACT IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
To this point, we have demonstrated that were one to as-
sume the position of a Martian observer, come to our planet to 
examine the constitutionality of the Rules Enabling Act as ap-
plied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,109 one should at 
the very least have serious difficulty with the question. Yet, 
mired in the history and practicalities of our own constitutional 
doctrine, it is generally understood today that the Act’s consti-
tutionality is beyond question. When one engages in more care-
ful analysis of the Supreme Court decisions reaching this con-
clusion, however, it is striking how flimsy is the judicial house 
of cards doctrinally supporting the Act’s constitutionality. 
1. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 
No decision appears to have adjudicated a direct, serious 
constitutional challenge to the Rules Enabling Act, either on its 
face or applied. The decision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 
generally assumed to have held the Act constitutional, actually 
dealt only with the validity of Rules 35 and 37.110 It is true 
that, in the course of upholding those Rules under the Act, the 
Court indicated in dictum that the Act is constitutional.111 But 
it is interesting to note how devoid of supportive reasoning this 
conclusion is. “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the 
practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that 
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to 
make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of 
 
 109. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business 
Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian 
Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1992) (employing the construct of a 
Martian observer to test the wisdom and logic of long-standing doctrines of 
federal jurisdiction). 
 110. See 312 U.S. 1, 6 (1941) (“This case calls for decision as to the validity 
of Rules 35 and 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for [d]istrict [c]ourts of the 
United States.”) (citation omitted). 
 111. See id. at 13–14. 
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the United States . . . .”112 Decided at the height of the New 
Deal, Sibbach’s conclusory dismissal of structural constitu-
tional concerns such as the nondelegation doctrine and the 
case-or-controversy requirement is perhaps not surprising. But 
what may be most telling about the decision is language that 
reveals—in a manner reminiscent of the flawed assumptions of 
the Act’s drafters113—the Court’s fatally simplistic understand-
ing of the substance-procedure distinction. Congress, said the 
Court, “has never essayed to declare the substantive state law, 
or to abolish or nullify a right recognized by the substantive 
law of the state where the cause of action arose, save where a 
right or duty is imposed in a field committed to Congress by the 
Constitution.”114 Rather, “the Act . . . was purposely restricted 
in its operation to matters of pleading and court practice and 
procedure.”115 Noting that “the petitioner admits, and, we 
think, correctly, that Rules 35 and 37 are rules of procedure,”116 
the Court upheld the rules because “[t]he test must be whether 
a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for en-
forcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for 
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or in-
fraction of them.”117 
Like the Act’s drafters who inserted the restriction on the 
Rules’ ability to modify, enlarge, or abridge substantive rights, 
the Court seems—implicitly, at least—to assume a mutual ex-
clusivity of procedure and substance.118 A strict construction of 
the case-or-controversy requirement might still be problematic 
for the federal courts’ power to issue freestanding rules of even 
 
 112. Id. at 9–10 (citation omitted). 
 113. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 114. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10. While the Court spoke only of substantive 
rights created by state law, Professor Burbank has correctly noted that the 
Act’s exemption of substantive rights applies equally to federal- and state-
created substantive rights. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1122 (noting that 
while “Professor Ely has invigorated the second sentence [of the Act] so as 
more effectively to protect substantive state policy reflected in state law in an 
area covered by a Federal Rule,” history starkly contradicts this notion, as the 
protection of state law is a probable effect rather than the primary purpose of 
the allocation scheme established by the Act). Indeed, at the time the Act was 
passed in 1934, the Supreme Court had not even decided Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), invalidating general federal common law, id. at 
78. 
 115. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10. 
 116. Id. at 11. 
 117. Id. at 14. 
 118. See id. at 9–14. 
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pure procedure, since the Court promulgates them in a manner 
untied to conduct of the adjudicatory process. However, when 
viewed from the perspective of the democratic rationale for this 
constitutional requirement,119 the concern would not be nearly 
as great were the Supreme Court’s rulemaking power actually 
confined to procedural concerns that did not extend beyond the 
walls of the courthouse. We know today, however, that it is ab-
surd to assume such a mutual exclusivity for all but the most 
mundane of housekeeping rules. Procedural rules often have 
dramatic impact on the citizenry’s planning of their primary 
behavior,120 and often involve issues of significant concern to 
policy makers and those whom they represent. Rarely, then, 
does the concept of totally insulated procedural rules, assumed 
by the Court in Sibbach, actually exist. 
2. Mistretta v. United States 
While in Hanna v. Plumer the Court assumed the constitu-
tionality of the Rules Enabling Act,121 the only decision other 
than Sibbach in which the Court expended any effort to discuss 
the Act’s constitutionality—albeit purely as dictum—was Mis-
tretta v. United States.122 The issue in Mistretta concerned the 
constitutionality of Congress’s location of the Sentencing Com-
mission in the judicial branch and the required inclusion of 
members of the Article III judiciary on that Commission.123 A 
challenge had been made to the Act on the grounds that it vio-
lated the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.124 In 
rejecting that challenge, the Court noted that in past decisions 
it had “recognized the constitutionality of a ‘twilight area’ in 
which the activities of the separate [b]ranches merge.”125 Spe-
cifically, the Court relied on Sibbach for recognition of Con-
gress’s “undoubted power” to delegate procedural rulemaking 
power to the Court.126 This reference, of course, is no less con-
clusory than was the Court’s original statement to the same ef-
 
 119. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 120. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (referring to “those primary decisions respecting human conduct which 
our constitutional system leaves to state regulation”). 
 121. 380 U.S. 460, 464–66 (1965). 
 122. 488 U.S. 361, 387–90 (1989). 
 123. Id. at 362. 
 124. Id. at 385. 
 125. Id. at 386. 
 126. Id. at 387 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941)). 
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fect in Sibbach.127 To the extent the Court provided any sup-
porting reasoning at all, it was in its assertion that “consistent 
with the separation of powers, Congress may delegate to the 
[j]udicial [b]ranch nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench 
upon the prerogatives of another [b]ranch and that are appro-
priate to the central mission of the Judiciary.”128 The point, ap-
parently, is that the case-or-controversy requirement is there 
solely to protect the authority of the other branches of the fed-
eral government.129 This analysis, of course, ignores the vitally 
important democratic rationale supporting the constitutional 
restriction of the authority of the one unrepresentative branch 
to the adjudication of cases or controversies.130 Even assuming 
that the Court’s assessment of the Rules Enabling Act was cor-
rect, it would still not mean that judicial rulemaking consti-
tutes adjudication of a case or controversy, which the Constitu-
tion’s text seems unambiguously to require, though concededly 
this point is probably of concern only to constitutional formal-
ists.131 More importantly, the Court’s reasoning in no way re-
sponds to the fundamental concern over the accountability, di-
rect or indirect, of the nation’s policy makers. 
One might suspect that the underlying, if unstated, as-
sumption of the Court was that because the Federal Rules con-
cern only “the appropriate mission of the Judiciary,” they are of 
purely procedural importance and therefore do not encroach on 
the authority of the policy-making branches of the federal gov-
ernment.132 We now know, of course, that such an assumption 
is nonsense.133 But the most puzzling aspect of the Mistretta 
Court’s discussion of the Rules Enabling Act’s constitutionality 
is that it apparently did understand that the Federal Rules are 
not created in a procedural vacuum. Indeed, the opinion explic-
itly acknowledged that “this Court’s rulemaking under the 
enabling Acts has been substantive and political in the sense  
 
 
 
 127. 312 U.S. at 9–10. 
 128. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388. 
 129. See id. at 388–91. 
 130. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 131. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 422–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132. We do not intend to suggest that at no point does the federal judiciary 
engage in policy making. The point, rather, is that under the constitutional 
scheme such policy making is authorized only to the extent it is incident to the 
resolution of live disputes. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 133. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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that the rules of procedure have important effects on the sub-
stantive rights of litigants.”134 In an accompanying footnote, the 
Court pointed to Rule 23, providing for the use of class actions, 
which “has inspired a controversy over the philosophical, social, 
and economic merits and demerits of class actions.”135 But if 
this is so, then why does the Rules Enabling Act not do the very 
thing that the Mistretta Court had stated that a delegation to 
the judicial branch may not do: interfere with the authority of 
the representative branches of the federal government?136 It is 
as if the Court, by relying on Sibbach, first validates the Rules 
Enabling Act by implicitly invoking that decision’s faulty prem-
ise of procedural-substantive mutual exclusivity (if only as a 
matter of Supreme Court precedent),137 and, having thus found 
the Act constitutional,138 readily acknowledges the faultiness of 
this essential premise. It is almost as if an acquitted criminal 
defendant, knowing he is protected by the constitutional prohi-
bition on double jeopardy, openly admits his crime. 
The doctrinal support for the Rules Enabling Act’s consti-
tutionality, then, is readily exposed as a house of cards. To be 
sure, legitimate or not, the holding of the Act’s constitutionality 
is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.139 However, we 
believe our skeptical constitutional analysis is valuable for two 
reasons. First, it is valuable simply as an intellectual study in 
constitutional theory. Second, on a more practical level it may 
have an important spillover impact on determination of the 
most appropriate construction of the Act’s “substantive right” 
limitation. It is therefore to a discussion of this issue of statu-
tory interpretation that we now turn. 
IV.  CONSTRUING THE RULES ENABLING ACT: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY CRITIQUE 
One highly respected commentator has suggested that the 
question of whether a Federal Rule is “substantive” or “proce-
dural” for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act is “inherently un- 
 
 
 
 134. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 392. 
 135. Id. at 392 n.19. 
 136. See id. at 385. 
 137. See. id. at 386–88. 
 138. Id. at 412. 
 139. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1034–35. 
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resolvable.”140 The Supreme Court has never invalidated a 
Federal Rule for violation of the Act’s “substantive right” limi-
tation. Nevertheless, there has been a good deal of controversy, 
both within the Court141 and without, on this issue of statutory 
interpretation.142 We have already conceded the pragmatic fu-
tility of today seeking to raise serious questions about the Act’s 
constitutionality. It is conceivable, however, that a parallel 
subconstitutional concern about the need for accountable policy 
makers should guide construction of the cryptic substance-
procedure distinction imposed by the Act itself. 
The greatest problem with any attempt to construe the 
Act’s substance-procedure distinction in a manner designed to 
consider this democratic concern is that the drafters were 
driven by two goals that are potentially in tension—a fact of 
which the drafters appear to have been blissfully unaware, for 
reasons previously discussed.143 In addition to the desire to 
preserve legislative authority over issues extending beyond the 
courthouse walls, the drafters were simultaneously driven by 
the goal of establishing a uniform system of federal proce-
dure.144 The more that the statute’s interpretation is designed 
to achieve the first goal, the more it is likely to undermine the 
second goal: because so many Rules impact important socio-
political concerns, many Rules would fail under the account-
ability critique we have described. 
There appear to be three interpretive options available in 
construing the Act’s substance-procedure distinction in order to 
take into account our democratic accountability critique. First, 
the Act could be confined to those few Rules that are largely of 
the housekeeping variety. Under this approach, the Act would 
authorize only those Rules that were likely to have no more 
than a remote impact beyond the courthouse walls. The obvious 
problem with this approach—at least as a matter of statutory  
 
 
 140. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class 
Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997). 
 141. See, e.g., Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 
U.S. 533, 540–64 (1991). 
 142. Compare Carrington, supra note 4, at 297–326 (suggesting a func-
tional analysis and interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act), with Ely, supra 
note 11, at 724–28 (proposing alternative interpretations of the “substantive 
rights” exception to the Rules Enabling Act). 
 143. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 144. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1023–24, 1065–68. 
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construction145—is that it would seriously undermine attain-
ment of the additional statutory goal of establishing a uniform 
system of federal procedure. 
A second option would be to exclude from the Court’s rule-
making authority only those Rules that undeniably give rise to 
widespread political concern. This second alternative would 
leave to the Court a large body of Rules, but would likely ex-
clude Rules such as those dealing with pleading burdens,146 
class actions,147 and electronic discovery.148 The obvious prob-
lem with this interpretive alternative is its political fluidity and 
difficulty in application. However, it at least represents an ef-
fort to reconcile the competing goals of the Act, by attempting 
to leave in the Court’s rulemaking power the majority of the 
current Rules.  
The final alternative is similar to the standard the Court 
itself seems to have adopted, though without any supporting 
reasoning grounded in political theory.149 It is to confine the 
Rules to those whose impact is predominantly designed to af-
fect nonprocedural interests.150 Recognizing that the Rules will 
often have incidental impacts on substantive concerns, the 
Court has confined the Act’s substantive right limitation to ex-
clude from its reach primarily procedural rules whose impact 
beyond the courthouse walls is merely incidental.151 This is so, 
even if that incidental and unintended substantive impact is 
substantial. 
It is difficult to choose among these alternatives, because 
they all possess significant flaws. However, from the perspec-
tive of our concern about truly accountable policy making, the 
second alternative seems to be the least of three evils. 
 
 145. Note, however, that such an approach would, in fact, likely result from 
acceptance of our constitutional attack. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 11. 
 147. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 148. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)–(d). More debatable would be rules such as those 
dealing with summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56, and judgment as a matter 
of law, FED. R. CIV. P. 50, where although there has been relatively little po-
litical controversy, the scope of the Rules could have a significant impact on 
the nature of the enforcement of substantive rights. See Martin H. Redish, 
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation 
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 (2005). 
 149. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that 
procedural rules that incidentally affect substantive rights are permissible 
under the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act). 
 150. Id. at 5. 
 151. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
One often hears the term “politicization” used in a pejora-
tive sense.152 To “politicize” something is usually to demean a 
process by removing it from the lofty heights of dispassionate 
analysis and thrusting it into the jungle of interest-group 
struggles. But when one employs the term in the context of a 
discussion of American political theory, it refers simply to re-
turning foundational normative choices of social policy to those 
who are representative of and accountable to the electorate.153 
In a system committed to the values of representative govern-
ment, then, politicization is by no means an inherently negative 
development. 
To be sure, there are certain issues that our political struc-
ture has sought to insulate from the democratic process. For 
example, we have wisely deemed questions of constitutional in-
terpretation to be reserved for the one branch of government 
purposely insulated from the democratic process—the judiciary. 
However, the same has never been true for subconstitutional 
issues of social policy. 
The fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concern 
processes employed within the federal courts does not auto-
matically imply that they are free from matters of serious con-
cern to the polity. Indeed, it is this fatally simplistic assump-
tion that has historically guided both Congress and the 
Supreme Court in the drafting and early construction of the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934.154 It was also this flawed assump-
tion that led the Court early on to assume the constitutionality 
of the Act’s delegation of lawmaking power to the Supreme 
Court. Today, all of those concerned recognize the inherent in-
tersection of substance and procedure.155 However, none has 
sought to go back in time to reconsider the modern constitu-
tional and statutory implications of this all too facile assump-
tion. 
In this Essay, we have dared to think the unthinkable: the 
possibility that the Rules Enabling Act—at least as currently 
implemented—should be found unconstitutional. While delega-
tions of federal legislative power to executive agencies are to-
 
 152. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 4, at 301–02. 
 153. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419–22 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 154. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 155. See Carrington, supra note 4, at 284. 
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day commonplace,156 comparable delegations to an unaccount-
able, coordinate branch of government—when that delegated 
authority is exercised in a nonadjudicatory manner—give rise 
to an entirely different set of political and constitutional diffi-
culties.157 Because of its intentional insulation from democratic 
processes, the federal judiciary’s lawmaking authority was con-
stitutionally confined to the traditional adjudicatory process. 
By delegating important policy-making authority to the Su-
preme Court outside of the adjudication of cases or controver-
sies, Congress in the Rules Enabling Act has violated the es-
sence of the separation of powers, and in so doing has 
undermined the essence of the democratic process. 
It is true, of course, that Congress always retains authority 
to legislatively reject or overrule a particular exercise of the 
Court’s rulemaking power. But this fact would surely not vali-
date a delegation of power to the Court to promulgate free-
standing rules of consumer protection or products liability law; 
nor should it save the otherwise unconstitutional delegation 
embodied in the Enabling Act. Once the Court promulgates a 
rule, that rule becomes law. It has altered the legal status quo 
and reversed the inertia inherent in the legislative process. Ab-
sent the rule’s existence, Congress would have to act, in one di-
rection or the other, or choose to let judicial procedure develop 
incrementally as an incident to the adjudicatory process.158 In 
contrast, with the rule in place Congress’s failure to act is effec-
tively transformed into legislative action, in direct contraven-
tion of the bicameralism and presentment requirements pro-
vided for in the Constitution. 
Holding that much of the rulemaking power must constitu-
tionally rest in congressional hands does not necessarily imply 
that the Court could have no influence in the process. By mak-
ing their expertise available to Congress, those presently in-
volved in the rulemaking process could still play an important 
role. However, the ultimate choice would remain where a con-
stitutional democracy intends it to be: in the hands of the rep-
resentative branches of government. 
In the highly likely event that our reconsideration of the 
Act’s constitutionality falls on deaf ears, it is conceivable that 
our accountability critique could still play a role in the inter-
 
 156. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370–74 (majority opinion). 
 157. See id. at 416–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1027–28. 
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pretation of the Act’s cryptic “substantive right” qualification. 
More than seventy years after the Act’s passage, the meaning 
of that provision remains the subject of vigorous and wide-
spread debate. We suggest that the provision be construed in 
the very manner apparently intended by the Act’s drafters: to 
preserve to the representative branches fundamental choices of 
social policy. Now that we recognize that many of the Rules are 
inherently intertwined with such policy issues, it is appropriate 
to redefine the phrase in a far more aggressive manner than it 
has been to date. 
